A Theory of Precedent: From Analytical Positivism to a Post-Analytical Philosophy of Law

Half Title Page\r......Page 1
Title Page......Page 3
Title verso\r......Page 4
Acknowledgments\r......Page 7
Abbreviated Contents\r......Page 9
Contents\r......Page 11
Part A: How to Do Things with Precedents\r......Page 17
1. WRÓBLEWSKI ON THE THREE IDEOLOGIES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING......Page 19
2. ROSS ON A JUDGE’S NORMATIVE IDEOLOGY......Page 22
3. HART ON THE RULE OF RECOGNITION......Page 24
4. OBJECT OF INQUIRY: PRECEDENTS AND PRECEDENT-FOLLOWING......Page 26
5. OBJECT OF INQUIRY REDEFINED: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PREMISES OF THE RATIO OF A CASE, AS DERIVED FROM THE MULTI-LEVEL STRUCTURE OF LAW......Page 30
6. LEGAL SYSTEMIC FRAME: PRECEDENTS IN THE CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW CONTEXT......Page 31
7. THEORETICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE: FROM ANALYTICAL POSITIVISM TO A POST-ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW......Page 33
8. AUXILIARY FRAME OF REFERENCE: DERRIDA, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND DECONSTRUCTION......Page 38
9. QUESTIONS ON METHOD: FROM ANALYTICAL MODEL CONSTRUCTION TO A RADICAL QUESTIONING OF THE ULTIMATE PREMISES OF LAW (“. . . UP AGAINST THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE”)......Page 45
10. OBJECTIONS AND REFUTATIONS......Page 50
1. THE IDEA OF STRONG AND WEAK LEGAL IMPUTATION......Page 57
2. DWORKIN’S CHALLENGE TO LEGAL POSITIVISM......Page 59
3. SUMMERS ON THE CATEGORIES OF LEGAL FORMALITY......Page 63
4. LEGAL PRINCIPLES REDEFINED AS NORMS WITH LOW LEGAL FORMALITY......Page 65
5. RULES, PRINCIPLES, AND BACKGROUND REASONS OF LAW......Page 70
6. LEGAL RULES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES/POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT OF PRECEDENTS......Page 74
1. TERMINOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS......Page 81
2. THE MODELS OF PRECEDENT IDEOLOGY......Page 83
3. THE REALM OF PREDETERMINED MEANINGS: JUDICIAL REFERENCE......Page 94
4. A LAWGIVER, DRESSED IN ROBE: JUDICIAL LEGISLATION......Page 96
5. IN SEARCH OF THE PRIOR COURT’S ORIGINAL INTENTIONS: JUDICIAL EXEGESIS......Page 100
6. AN INTERPLAY OF SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY IN PRECEDENT-FOLLOWING: REASONING BY ANALOGY AND DISTINGUISHING......Page 107
7. SYSTEMIC CONSTRUCTION OF UNDERLYING REASONS FROM A PRIOR COURT DECISION OR LINE OF DECISIONS......Page 112
8. REJUDGING A PRIOR COURT DECISION: JUDICIAL REVALUATION......Page 118
9. AXIOLOGICAL AND TELEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND REASONS OF LAW: JUDICIAL CONSEQUENTIALISM AND RIGHTNESS REASONS IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING......Page 121
1. OPERATIVE PRECEDENT-NORM CONCEPTION......Page 125
3. SYSTEMIC STATICS OF PRECEDENT-FOLLOWING: DEGREE OF SYSTEMATICITY IN A SET OF PRECEDENTS......Page 126
4. SYSTEMIC DYNAMICS OF PRECEDENT-FOLLOWING......Page 127
5. METHOD OF ARGUMENTATION ADOPTED IN A PRECEDENT IDEOLOGY......Page 131
6. TECHNIQUES OF DEPARTURE FROM A PRECEDENT......Page 132
7. THEORETICAL RATIONALE OF A PRECEDENT IDEOLOGY......Page 133
1. JUDICIAL EXEGESIS WITH FORMALLY DEFINED RATIO DECIDENDI (UNITED KINGDOM)......Page 137
2. A FLEXIBLE SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE RULES UNDER LEGAL PRAGMATISM (UNITED STATES/STATE OF NEW YORK)......Page 139
3. DIVERGENCE OF OFFICIAL ACTION AND PROFESSIONAL SELF-UNDERSTANDING OF THE JUDICIARY (FRANCE)......Page 143
4. A FLOOD OF DISCORDANT PRECEDENTS UNDER MUTUALLY INCONSISTENT THEORETICAL PREMISES (ITALY)......Page 144
5. A FREE-FLOATING SYSTEM OF OUTWEIGHABLE AND FORMALLY BINDING REASONS (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY)......Page 148
6. JUDICIAL POSITIVISM UNDER A PERPLEXED RELATION OF A CASE’S HEADNOTE AND THE WHOLE OF JUDICIAL REASONING (FINLAND)......Page 151
7. CONCLUSION: FROM PURE TYPES OF PRECEDENT IDEOLOGY TO THE LAW IN ACTION IN PRECEDENT-FOLLOWING (A TALE OF GRASSHOPPERS, BEEHIVES AND ANTHILLS)......Page 159
Part B: A Theory of the Multi-Level Structure of Law......Page 165
1. PROLOGUE: SURFACE-STRUCTURE LEVEL OF OPERATIVE PRECEDENT-IDENTIFICATION AND PRECEDENT-FOLLOWING......Page 167
2. GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE MULTI-LEVEL THEORY OF LAW AND ITS RELATION TO TUORI’S CONCEPTION OF LAW......Page 168
3. REFRAMING THE IDEOLOGICAL PREMISES OF PRECEDENT-FOLLOWING......Page 176
4. A RULE OF LAW IDEOLOGY FOR PRECEDENTS?......Page 181
5. THE “VIEW FROM THE BENCH”: A RULE OF LAW IDEOLOGY FOR PRECEDENTS CONTESTED BY THE BAD FAITH ARGUMENT......Page 191
2. THE AXIOMATIC GROUND OF LEGAL DISCOURSE: RATIO AND AUCTORITAS......Page 195
3. FELICITIES AND INFELICITIES OF LEGAL DISCOURSE......Page 201
4. THE “VIEW FROM THE BENCH” REVISITED: THE FELICITY CONDITIONS OF LEGAL ADJUDICATION AND THE QUEST FOR EMPIRICAL LEGITIMACY......Page 208
5. LIMITS OF THE DISCOURSE-THEORETICAL FRAME OF LAW: META-RULES, SPEECH ACTS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS......Page 211
1. PROLOGUE: HOW LONG IS THE STANDARD METRE?......Page 213
2. THE INFRASTRUCTURES OF LEGAL NORM CONSTITUTION: THE CONSTITUTIVE A PRIORI OF LAW......Page 217
3. THE FINAL VALIDITY GROUND OF LAW: VALIDITY OF LEGAL VALIDITY......Page 220
4. RATIONALITY OF LEGAL RATIONALITY: THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF LEGAL JUSTIFIABILITY......Page 231
6. NORM/FACT CHARACTER OF THE ULTIMATE RULE OF RECOGNITION......Page 237
7. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A “STANDARD NORM” FOR LAW?......Page 245
1. PROLOGUE: “AN INFALLIBLE PARADIGM OF IDENTITY”?......Page 249
2. DIFFÉRANCE (“THIS ALMOST NOTHING OF THE UNPRESENTABLE”)......Page 251
3. SYNTAGMATIC AND PARADIGMATIC DIMENSIONS OF LANGUAGE, AND THE A PRIORI OF A DISCOURSE FORMATION......Page 254
4. AN OUTLINE OF THE FOUR PARADIGMS OF JUDICIAL SIGNIFICATION UNDER PRECEDENT-FOLLOWING AND RELATED JUDICIAL IMAGERY......Page 255
5. ASCRIPTION OF MEANING-CONTENT TO THE RATIO OF A CASE UNDER THE FOUR PARADIGMS OF JUDICIAL SIGNIFICATION UNDER PRECEDENT-FOLLOWING......Page 258
6. IN CONCLUSION: DIFFÉRANCE AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL SIGNIFICATION UNDER PRECEDENT-FOLLOWING......Page 262
1. HOW TO READ PRECEDENTS......Page 265
2. FROM ANALYTICAL POSITIVISM TO A DECONSTRUCTION OF LAW......Page 271
3. CONCEPTUAL ANALYTICS OF PRECEDENT-NORM FORMATION, PRESENTED IN THE FORM OF A TRIANGLE (OR “ICEBERG”)......Page 276
4. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PRECEDENTS......Page 278
5. READING THE LAW/SKATING ON THIN ICE......Page 280
Bibliography......Page 285
Index......Page 295