A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems

Cover
Title Page
Copyright
About the Author
Acknowledgements
Contents at a Glance
Contents
Preface to the Third Edition
Preface to the Second Edition
Preface to the First Edition
For my daughter, and other lawyers…
Foreword
Part I
	Chapter 1 What Is Security Engineering?
		1.1 Introduction
		1.2 A framework
		1.3 Example 1 – a bank
		1.4 Example 2 – a military base
		1.5 Example 3 – a hospital
		1.6 Example 4 – the home
		1.7 Definitions
		1.8 Summary
	Chapter 2 Who Is the Opponent?
		2.1 Introduction
		2.2 Spies
			2.2.1 The Five Eyes
				2.2.1.1 Prism
				2.2.1.2 Tempora
				2.2.1.3 Muscular
				2.2.1.4 Special collection
				2.2.1.5 Bullrun and Edgehill
				2.2.1.6 Xkeyscore
				2.2.1.7 Longhaul
				2.2.1.8 Quantum
				2.2.1.9 CNE
				2.2.1.10 The analyst’s viewpoint
				2.2.1.11 Offensive operations
				2.2.1.12 Attack scaling
			2.2.2 China
			2.2.3 Russia
			2.2.4 The rest
			2.2.5 Attribution
		2.3 Crooks
			2.3.1 Criminal infrastructure
				2.3.1.1 Botnet herders
				2.3.1.2 Malware devs
				2.3.1.3 Spam senders
				2.3.1.4 Bulk account compromise
				2.3.1.5 Targeted attackers
				2.3.1.6 Cashout gangs
				2.3.1.7 Ransomware
			2.3.2 Attacks on banking and payment systems
			2.3.3 Sectoral cybercrime ecosystems
			2.3.4 Internal attacks
			2.3.5 CEO crimes
			2.3.6 Whistleblowers
		2.4 Geeks
		2.5 The swamp
			2.5.1 Hacktivism and hate campaigns
			2.5.2 Child sex abuse material
			2.5.3 School and workplace bullying
			2.5.4 Intimate relationship abuse
		2.6 Summary
		Research problems
		2.6 Further reading
	Chapter 3 Psychology and Usability
		3.1 Introduction
		3.2 Insights from psychology research
			3.2.1 Cognitive psychology
			3.2.2 Gender, diversity and interpersonal variation
			3.2.3 Social psychology
				3.2.3.1 Authority and its abuse
				3.2.3.2 The bystander effect
			3.2.4 The social-brain theory of deception
			3.2.5 Heuristics, biases and behavioural economics
				3.2.5.1 Prospect theory and risk misperception
				3.2.5.2 Present bias and hyperbolic discounting
				3.2.5.3 Defaults and nudges
				3.2.5.4 The default to intentionality
				3.2.5.5 The affect heuristic
				3.2.5.6 Cognitive dissonance
				3.2.5.7 The risk thermostat
		3.3 Deception in practice
			3.3.1 The salesman and the scamster
			3.3.2 Social engineering
			3.3.3 Phishing
			3.3.4 Opsec
			3.3.5 Deception research
		3.4 Passwords
			3.4.1 Password recovery
			3.4.2 Password choice
			3.4.3 Difficulties with reliable password entry
			3.4.4 Difficulties with remembering the password
				3.4.4.1 Naïve choice
				3.4.4.2 User abilities and training
				3.4.4.3 Design errors
				3.4.4.4 Operational failures
				3.4.4.5 Social-engineering attacks
				3.4.4.6 Customer education
				3.4.4.7 Phishing warnings
			3.4.5 Systemissues
			3.4.6 Can you deny service?
			3.4.7 Protecting oneself or others?
			3.4.8 Attacks on password entry
				3.4.8.1 Interface design
				3.4.8.2 Trusted path, and bogus terminals
				3.4.8.3 Technical defeats of password retry counters
			3.4.9 Attacks on password storage
				3.4.9.1 One-way encryption
				3.4.9.2 Password cracking
				3.4.9.3 Remote password checking
			3.4.10 Absolute limits
			3.4.11 Using a passwordmanager
			3.4.12 Will we ever get rid of passwords?
		3.5 CAPTCHAs
		3.6 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 4 Protocols
		4.1 Introduction
		4.2 Password eavesdropping risks
		4.3 Who goes there? – simple authentication
			4.3.1 Challenge and response
			4.3.2 Two-factor authentication
			4.3.3 The MIG-in-the-middle attack
			4.3.4 Reflection attacks
		4.4 Manipulating the message
		4.5 Changing the environment
		4.6 Chosen protocol attacks
		4.7 Managing encryption keys
			4.7.1 The resurrecting duckling
			4.7.2 Remote key management
			4.7.3 The Needham-Schroeder protocol
			4.7.4 Kerberos
			4.7.5 Practical key management
		4.8 Design assurance
		4.9 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 5 Cryptography
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 Historical background
			5.2.1 An early stream cipher – the Vigenère
			5.2.2 The one-time pad
			5.2.3 An early block cipher – Playfair
			5.2.4 Hash functions
			5.2.5 Asymmetric primitives
		5.3 Security models
			5.3.1 Random functions – hash functions
				5.3.1.1 Properties
				5.3.1.2 The birthday theorem
			5.3.2 Random generators – stream ciphers
			5.3.3 Random permutations – block ciphers
			5.3.4 Public key encryption and trapdoor one-way permutations
		5.4 Symmetric crypto algorithms
			5.4.1 SP-networks
				5.4.1.1 Block size
				5.4.1.2 Number of rounds
				5.4.1.3 Choice of S-boxes
				5.4.1.4 Linear cryptanalysis
				5.4.1.5 Differential cryptanalysis
			5.4.2 The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
			5.4.3 Feistel ciphers
				5.4.3.1 The Luby-Rackoff result
				5.4.3.2 DES
		5.5 Modes of operation
			5.5.1 How not to use a block cipher
			5.5.2 Cipher block chaining
			5.5.3 Counter encryption
			5.5.4 Legacy stream cipher modes
			5.5.5 Message authentication code
			5.5.6 Galois counter mode
			5.5.7 XTS
		5.6 Hash functions
			5.6.1 Common hash functions
			5.6.2 Hash function applications – HMAC, commitments and updating
		5.7 Asymmetric crypto primitives
			5.7.1 Cryptography based on factoring
			5.7.2 Cryptography based on discrete logarithms
				5.7.2.1 One-way commutative encryption
				5.7.2.2 Diffie-Hellman key establishment
				5.7.2.3 ElGamal digital signature and DSA
			5.7.3 Elliptic curve cryptography
			5.7.4 Certification authorities
			5.7.5 TLS
				5.7.5.1 TLS uses
				5.7.5.2 TLS security
				5.7.5.3 TLS 1.3
			5.7.6 Other public-key protocols
				5.7.6.1 Code signing
				5.7.6.2 PGP/GPG
				5.7.6.3 QUIC
			5.7.7 Special-purpose primitives
			5.7.8 How strong are asymmetric cryptographic primitives?
			5.7.9 What else goes wrong
		5.8 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 6 Access Control
		6.1 Introduction
		6.2 Operating system access controls
			6.2.1 Groups and roles
			6.2.2 Access control lists
			6.2.3 Unix operating system security
			6.2.4 Capabilities
			6.2.5 DAC and MAC
			6.2.6 Apple’s macOS
			6.2.7 iOS
			6.2.8 Android
			6.2.9 Windows
			6.2.10 Middleware
				6.2.10.1 Database access controls
				6.2.10.2 Browsers
			6.2.11 Sandboxing
			6.2.12 Virtualisation
		6.3 Hardware protection
			6.3.1 Intel processors
			6.3.2 Arm processors
		6.4 What goes wrong
			6.4.1 Smashing the stack
			6.4.2 Other technical attacks
			6.4.3 User interface failures
			6.4.4 Remedies
			6.4.5 Environmental creep
		6.5 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 7 Distributed Systems
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 Concurrency
			7.2.1 Using old data versus paying to propagate state
			7.2.2 Locking to prevent inconsistent updates
			7.2.3 The order of updates
			7.2.4 Deadlock
			7.2.5 Non-convergent state
			7.2.6 Secure time
		7.3 Fault tolerance and failure recovery
			7.3.1 Failure models
				7.3.1.1 Byzantine failure
				7.3.1.2 Interaction with fault tolerance
			7.3.2 What is resilience for?
			7.3.3 At what level is the redundancy?
			7.3.4 Service-denial attacks
		7.4 Naming
			7.4.1 The Needham naming principles
			7.4.2 What else goes wrong
				7.4.2.1 Naming and identity
				7.4.2.2 Cultural assumptions
				7.4.2.3 Semantic content of names
				7.4.2.4 Uniqueness of names
				7.4.2.5 Stability of names and addresses
				7.4.2.6 Restrictions on the use of names
			7.4.3 Types of name
		7.5 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 8 Economics
		8.1 Introduction
		8.2 Classical economics
			8.2.1 Monopoly
		8.3 Information economics
			8.3.1 Why information markets are different
			8.3.2 The value of lock-in
			8.3.3 Asymmetric information
			8.3.4 Public goods
		8.4 Game theory
			8.4.1 The prisoners’ dilemma
			8.4.2 Repeated and evolutionary games
		8.5 Auction theory
		8.6 The economics of security and dependability
			8.6.1 Why is Windows so insecure?
			8.6.2 Managing the patching cycle
			8.6.3 Structural models of attack and defence
			8.6.4 The economics of lock-in, tying and DRM
			8.6.5 Antitrust law and competition policy
			8.6.6 Perversely motivated guards
			8.6.7 Economics of privacy
			8.6.8 Organisations and human behaviour
			8.6.9 Economics of cybercrime
		8.7 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
Part II
	Chapter 9 Multilevel Security
		9.1 Introduction
		9.2 What is a security policy model?
		9.3 Multilevel security policy
			9.3.1 The Anderson report
			9.3.2 The Bell-LaPadulamodel
			9.3.3 The standard criticisms of Bell-LaPadula
			9.3.4 The evolution of MLS policies
			9.3.5 The Biba model
		9.4 Historical examples of MLS systems
			9.4.1 SCOMP
			9.4.2 Data diodes
		9.5 MAC: from MLS to IFC and integrity
			9.5.1 Windows
			9.5.2 SELinux
			9.5.3 Embedded systems
		9.6 What goes wrong
			9.6.1 Composability
			9.6.2 The cascade problem
			9.6.3 Covert channels
			9.6.4 The threat from malware
			9.6.5 Polyinstantiation
			9.6.6 Practical problems with MLS
		9.7 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 10 Boundaries
		10.1 Introduction
		10.2 Compartmentation and the lattice model
		10.3 Privacy for tigers
		10.4 Health record privacy
			10.4.1 The threat model
			10.4.2 The BMA security policy
			10.4.3 First practical steps
			10.4.4 What actually goes wrong
				10.4.4.1 Emergency care
				10.4.4.2 Resilience
				10.4.4.3 Secondary uses
			10.4.5 Confidentiality – the future
			10.4.6 Ethics
			10.4.7 Social care and education
			10.4.8 The Chinese Wall
		10.5 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 11 Inference Control
		11.1 Introduction
		11.2 The early history of inference control
			11.2.1 The basic theory of inference control
				11.2.1.1 Query set size control
				11.2.1.2 Trackers
				11.2.1.3 Cell suppression
				11.2.1.4 Other statistical disclosure control mechanisms
				11.2.1.6 Randomization
			11.2.2 Limits of classical statistical security
			11.2.3 Active attacks
			11.2.4 Inference control in rich medical data
			11.2.5 The third wave: preferences and search
			11.2.6 The fourth wave: location and social
		11.3 Differential privacy
		11.4 Mind the gap?
			11.4.1 Tactical anonymity and its problems
			11.4.2 Incentives
			11.4.3 Alternatives
			11.4.4 The dark side
		11.5 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 12 Banking and Bookkeeping
		12.1 Introduction
		12.2 Bookkeeping systems
			12.2.1 Double-entry bookkeeping
			12.2.2 Bookkeeping in banks
			12.2.3 The Clark-Wilson security policy model
			12.2.4 Designing internal controls
			12.2.5 Insider frauds
			12.2.6 Executive frauds
				12.2.6.1 The post office case
				12.2.6.2 Other failures
				12.2.6.3 Ecological validity
				12.2.6.4 Control tuning and corporate governance
			12.2.7 Finding the weak spots
		12.3 Interbank payment systems
			12.3.1 A telegraphic history of E-commerce
			12.3.2 SWIFT
			12.3.3 What goes wrong
		12.4 Automatic teller machines
			12.4.1 ATM basics
			12.4.2 What goes wrong
			12.4.3 Incentives and injustices
		12.5 Credit cards
			12.5.1 Credit card fraud
			12.5.2 Online card fraud
			12.5.3 3DS
			12.5.4 Fraud engines
		12.6 EMV payment cards
			12.6.1 Chip cards
				12.6.1.1 Static data authentication
				12.6.1.2 ICVVs, DDA and CDA
				12.6.1.3 The No-PIN attack
			12.6.2 The preplay attack
			12.6.3 Contactless
		12.7 Online banking
			12.7.1 Phishing
			12.7.2 CAP
			12.7.3 Banking malware
			12.7.4 Phones as second factors
			12.7.5 Liability
			12.7.6 Authorised push payment fraud
		12.8 Nonbank payments
			12.8.1 M-Pesa
			12.8.2 Other phone payment systems
			12.8.3 Sofort, and open banking
		12.9 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 13 Locks and Alarms
		13.1 Introduction
		13.2 Threats and barriers
			13.2.1 Threat model
			13.2.2 Deterrence
			13.2.3 Walls and barriers
			13.2.4 Mechanical locks
			13.2.5 Electronic locks
		13.3 Alarms
			13.3.1 How not to protect a painting
			13.3.2 Sensor defeats
			13.3.3 Feature interactions
			13.3.4 Attacks on communications
			13.3.5 Lessons learned
		13.4 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 14 Monitoring and Metering
		14.1 Introduction
		14.2 Prepayment tokens
			14.2.1 Utility metering
			14.2.2 How the STS system works
			14.2.3 What goes wrong
			14.2.4 Smart meters and smart grids
			14.2.5 Ticketing fraud
		14.3 Taxi meters, tachographs and truck speed limiters
			14.3.1 The tachograph
			14.3.2 What goes wrong
				14.3.2.1 How most tachograph manipulation is done
				14.3.2.2 Tampering with the supply
				14.3.2.3 Tampering with the instrument
				14.3.2.4 High-tech attacks
			14.3.3 Digital tachographs
				14.3.3.1 System-level problems
				14.3.3.2 Other problems
			14.3.4 Sensor defeats and third-generation devices
			14.3.5 The fourth generation – smart tachographs
		14.4 Curfew tags: GPS as policeman
		14.5 Postage meters
		14.6 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 15 Nuclear Command and Control
		15.1 Introduction
		15.2 The evolution of command and control
			15.2.1 The Kennedy memorandum
			15.2.2 Authorization, environment, intent
		15.3 Unconditionally secure authentication
		15.4 Shared control schemes
		15.5 Tamper resistance and PALs
		15.6 Treaty verification
		15.7 What goes wrong
			15.7.1 Nuclear accidents
			15.7.2 Interaction with cyberwar
			15.7.3 Technical failures
		15.8 Secrecy or openness?
		15.9 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 16 Security Printing and Seals
		16.1 Introduction
		16.2 History
		16.3 Security printing
			16.3.1 Threat model
			16.3.2 Security printing techniques
		16.4 Packaging and seals
			16.4.1 Substrate properties
			16.4.2 The problems of glue
			16.4.3 PIN mailers
		16.5 Systemic vulnerabilities
			16.5.1 Peculiarities of the threat model
			16.5.2 Anti-gundecking measures
			16.5.3 The effect of random failure
			16.5.4 Materials control
			16.5.5 Not protecting the right things
			16.5.6 The cost and nature of inspection
		16.6 Evaluation methodology
		16.7 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 17 Biometrics
		17.1 Introduction
		17.2 Handwritten signatures
		17.3 Face recognition
		17.4 Fingerprints
			17.4.1 Verifying positive or negative identity claims
			17.4.2 Crime scene forensics
		17.5 Iris codes
		17.6 Voice recognition and morphing
		17.7 Other systems
		17.8 What goes wrong
		17.9 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 18 Tamper Resistance
		18.1 Introduction
		18.2 History
		18.3 Hardware security modules
		18.4 Evaluation
		18.5 Smartcards and other security chips
			18.5.1 History
			18.5.2 Architecture
			18.5.3 Security evolution
			18.5.4 Random number generators and PUFs
			18.5.5 Larger chips
			18.5.6 The state of the art
		18.6 The residual risk
			18.6.1 The trusted interface problem
			18.6.2 Conflicts
			18.6.3 The lemons market, risk dumping and evaluation games
			18.6.4 Security-by-obscurity
			18.6.5 Changing environments
		18.7 So what should one protect?
		18.8 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 19 Side Channels
		19.1 Introduction
		19.2 Emission security
			19.2.1 History
			19.2.2 Technical surveillance and countermeasures
		19.3 Passive attacks
			19.3.1 Leakage through power and signal cables
			19.3.2 Leakage through RF signals
			19.3.3 What goes wrong
		19.4 Attacks between and within computers
			19.4.1 Timing analysis
			19.4.2 Power analysis
			19.4.3 Glitching and differential fault analysis
			19.4.4 Rowhammer, CLKscrew and Plundervolt
			19.4.5 Meltdown, Spectre and other enclave side channels
		19.5 Environmental side channels
			19.5.1 Acoustic side channels
			19.5.2 Optical side channels
			19.5.3 Other side-channels
		19.6 Social side channels
		19.7 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 20 Advanced Cryptographic Engineering
		20.1 Introduction
		20.2 Full‐disk encryption
		20.3 Signal
		20.4 Tor
		20.5 HSMs
			20.5.1 The xor-to-null-key attack
			20.5.2 Attacks using backwards compatibility and time-memory tradeoffs
			20.5.3 Differential protocol attacks
			20.5.4 The EMV attack
			20.5.5 Hacking the HSMs in CAs and clouds
			20.5.6 Managing HSM risks
		20.6 Enclaves
		20.7 Blockchains
			20.7.1 Wallets
			20.7.2 Miners
			20.7.3 Smart contracts
			20.7.4 Off-chain payment mechanisms
			20.7.5 Exchanges, cryptocrime and regulation
			20.7.6 Permissioned blockchains
		20.8 Crypto dreams that failed
		20.9 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 21 Network Attack and Defence
		21.1 Introduction
		21.2 Network protocols and service denial
			21.2.1 BGP security
			21.2.2 DNS security
			21.2.3 UDP, TCP, SYN floods and SYN reflection
			21.2.4 Other amplifiers
			21.2.5 Other denial-of-service attacks
			21.2.6 Email – fromspies to spammers
		21.3 The malware menagerie – Trojans, worms and RATs
			21.3.1 Early history ofmalware
			21.3.2 The Internet worm
			21.3.3 Further malware evolution
			21.3.4 How malware works
			21.3.5 Countermeasures
		21.4 Defense against network attack
			21.4.1 Filtering: firewalls, censorware and wiretaps
				21.4.1.1 Packet filtering
				21.4.1.2 Circuit gateways
				21.4.1.3 Application proxies
				21.4.1.4 Ingress versus egress filtering
				21.4.1.5 Architecture
			21.4.2 Intrusion detection
				21.4.2.1 Types of intrusion detection
				21.4.2.2 General limitations of intrusion detection
				21.4.2.3 Specific problems detecting network attacks
		21.5 Cryptography: the ragged boundary
			21.5.1 SSH
			21.5.2 Wireless networking at the periphery
				21.5.2.1 WiFi
				21.5.2.2 Bluetooth
				21.5.2.3 HomePlug
				21.5.2.4 VPNs
		21.6 CAs and PKI
		21.7 Topology
		21.8 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 22 Phones
		22.1 Introduction
		22.2 Attacks on phone networks
			22.2.1 Attacks on phone-callmetering
			22.2.2 Attacks on signaling
			22.2.3 Attacks on switching and configuration
			22.2.4 Insecure end systems
			22.2.5 Feature interaction
			22.2.6 VOIP
			22.2.7 Frauds by phone companies
			22.2.8 Security economics of telecomms
		22.3 Going mobile
			22.3.1 GSM
			22.3.2 3G
			22.3.3 4G
			22.3.4 5G and beyond
			22.3.5 General MNO failings
		22.4 Platform security
			22.4.1 The Android app ecosystem
				22.4.1.1 App markets and developers
				22.4.1.2 Bad Android implementations
				22.4.1.3 Permissions
				22.4.1.4 Android malware
				22.4.1.5 Ads and third-party services
				22.4.1.6 Pre-installed apps
			22.4.2 Apple’s app ecosystem
			22.4.3 Cross-cutting issues
		22.5 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 23 Electronic and Information Warfare
		23.1 Introduction
		23.2 Basics
		23.3 Communications systems
			23.3.1 Signals intelligence techniques
			23.3.2 Attacks on communications
			23.3.3 Protection techniques
				23.3.3.1 Frequency hopping
				23.3.3.2 DSSS
				23.3.3.3 Burst communications
				23.3.3.4 Combining covertness and jam resistance
			23.3.4 Interaction between civil and military uses
		23.4 Surveillance and target acquisition
			23.4.1 Types of radar
			23.4.2 Jamming techniques
			23.4.3 Advanced radars and countermeasures
			23.4.4 Other sensors and multisensor issues
		23.5 IFF systems
		23.6 Improvised explosive devices
		23.7 Directed energy weapons
		23.8 Information warfare
			23.8.1 Attacks on control systems
			23.8.2 Attacks on other infrastructure
			23.8.3 Attacks on elections and political stability
			23.8.4 Doctrine
		23.9 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 24 Copyright and DRM
		24.1 Introduction
		24.2 Copyright
			24.2.1 Software
			24.2.2 Free software, free culture?
			24.2.3 Books and music
			24.2.4 Video and pay-TV
				24.2.4.1 Typical system architecture
				24.2.4.2 Video scrambling techniques
				24.2.4.3 Attacks on hybrid scrambling systems
				24.2.4.4 DVB
			24.2.5 DVD
		24.3 DRM on general‐purpose computers
			24.3.1 Windows media rights management
			24.3.2 FairPlay, HTML5 and other DRM systems
			24.3.3 Software obfuscation
			24.3.4 Gaming, cheating, and DRM
			24.3.5 Peer-to-peer systems
			24.3.6 Managing hardware design rights
		24.4 Information hiding
			24.4.1 Watermarks and copy generation management
			24.4.2 General information hiding techniques
			24.4.3 Attacks on copyright marking schemes
		24.5 Policy
			24.5.1 The IP lobby
			24.5.2 Who benefits?
		24.6 Accessory control
		24.7 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 25 New Directions?
		25.1 Introduction
		25.2 Autonomous and remotely‐piloted vehicles
			25.2.1 Drones
			25.2.2 Self-driving cars
			25.2.3 The levels and limits of automation
			25.2.4 How to hack a self-driving car
		25.3 AI / ML
			25.3.1 ML and security
			25.3.2 Attacks on ML systems
			25.3.3 ML and society
		25.4 PETS and operational security
			25.4.1 Anonymous messaging devices
			25.4.2 Social support
			25.4.3 Living off the land
			25.4.4 Putting it all together
			25.4.5 The name’s Bond. James Bond
		25.5 Elections
			25.5.1 The history of voting machines
			25.5.2 Hanging chads
			25.5.3 Optical scan
			25.5.4 Software independence
			25.5.5 Why electronic elections are hard
		25.6 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
Part III
	Chapter 26 Surveillance or Privacy?
		26.1 Introduction
		26.2 Surveillance
			26.2.1 The history of government wiretapping
			26.2.2 Call data records (CDRs)
			26.2.3 Search terms and location data
			26.2.4 Algorithmic processing
			26.2.5 ISPs and CSPs
			26.2.6 The Five Eyes’ system of systems
			26.2.7 The crypto wars
				26.2.7.1 The back story to crypto policy
				26.2.7.2 DES and crypto research
				26.2.7.3 CryptoWar 1 – the Clipper chip
				26.2.7.4 CryptoWar 2 – going spotty
			26.2.8 Export control
		26.3 Terrorism
			26.3.1 Causes of political violence
			26.3.2 The psychology of political violence
			26.3.3 The role of institutions
			26.3.4 The democratic response
		26.4 Censorship
			26.4.1 Censorship by authoritarian regimes
			26.4.2 Filtering, hate speech and radicalisation
		26.5 Forensics and rules of evidence
			26.5.1 Forensics
			26.5.2 Admissibility of evidence
			26.5.3 What goes wrong
		26.6 Privacy and data protection
			26.6.1 European data protection
			26.6.2 Privacy regulation in the USA
			26.6.3 Fragmentation?
		26.7 Freedom of information
		26.8 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 27 Secure Systems Development
		27.1 Introduction
		27.2 Risk management
		27.3 Lessons from safety‐critical systems
			27.3.1 Safety engineering methodologies
			27.3.2 Hazard analysis
			27.3.3 Fault trees and threat trees
			27.3.4 Failure modes and effects analysis
			27.3.5 Threatmodelling
			27.3.6 Quantifying risks
		27.4 Prioritising protection goals
		27.5 Methodology
			27.5.1 Top-down design
			27.5.2 Iterative design: fromspiral to agile
			27.5.3 The secure development lifecycle
			27.5.4 Gated development
			27.5.5 Software as a Service
			27.5.6 FromDevOps to DevSecOps
				27.5.6.1 The Azure ecosystem
				27.5.6.2 The Google ecosystem
				27.5.6.3 Creating a learning system
			27.5.7 The vulnerability cycle
				27.5.7.1 The CVE system
				27.5.7.2 Coordinated disclosure
				27.5.7.3 Security incident and event management
			27.5.8 Organizational mismanagement of risk
		27.6 Managing the team
			27.6.1 Elite engineers
			27.6.2 Diversity
			27.6.3 Nurturing skills and attitudes
			27.6.4 Emergent properties
			27.6.5 Evolving your workflow
			27.6.6 And finally…
		27.7 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 28 Assurance and Sustainability
		28.1 Introduction
		28.2 Evaluation
			28.2.1 Alarms and locks
			28.2.2 Safety evaluation regimes
			28.2.3 Medical device safety
			28.2.4 Aviation safety
			28.2.5 The Orange book
			28.2.6 FIPS 140 and HSMs
			28.2.7 The common criteria
				28.2.7.1 The gory details
				28.2.7.2 What goes wrong with the Common Criteria
				28.2.7.3 Collaborative protection profiles
			28.2.8 The ‘Principle of Maximum Complacency’
			28.2.9 Next steps
		28.3 Metrics and dynamics of dependability
			28.3.1 Reliability growth models
			28.3.2 Hostile review
			28.3.3 Free and open-source software
			28.3.4 Process assurance
		28.4 The entanglement of safety and security
			28.4.1 The electronic safety and security of cars
			28.4.2 Modernising safety and security regulation
			28.4.3 The Cybersecurity Act 2019
		28.5 Sustainability
			28.5.1 The Sales of goods directive
			28.5.2 New research directions
		28.6 Summary
		Research problems
		Further reading
	Chapter 29 Beyond “Computer Says No”
Bibliography
Index
EULA