A Dialogue Between Law and History: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Facts and Evidence

Preface
Contents
Law and History: Major Themes
History, Science, Law … and Truth: Reflections on Fact Finding in History, Science and Law
	References
A Comparison of Fact-Finding Methodology in Evidence Law and History
	1 Evidence Is a Common Problem Faced by History and Law
		1.1 Historical Facts Are the Common Research Objects of History and the Evidence Law
		1.2 The “Mirror of Evidence” Doctrine of Historical Fact-Finding
		1.3 Both History and Evidence Law Are Facing Scientific and Technological Challenges
	2 Differences Between Fact-Finding in History and Law
		2.1 The Difference of Subject Responsibility: Judicial Finality and the Endless Exploration of History
		2.2 Different Attitudes Towards Hearsay Are Determined by the Differences in Probandum
		2.3 Fact-Finding in History Lacks the Concept of Materiality
		2.4 Historical Evidence Analysis Lacks the Concept of Admissibility and the Definite Goal of “Justice-Seeking”
	3 Explanation Theory of Historical Facts in History and IBE of the Evidence Law
	4 Fact-Finding from the Perspective of Mutual Reference Between History and Law
		4.1 A Situation of Majority of Evidence Owned by One Party and Resolution Measures
		4.2 The Feasibility of Historical Interpretation of Evidence Rules
	5 Conclusion
	References
Facts and Proof: Concepts and Application
The Paradox of Proof: A Semiotic and Language-Based Critique
	1 Introduction
	2 Semiotic Model of Proof
		2.1 Evidence as Signs: Indexes, Icons, and Symbols
		2.2 The Semiotic Cycle
	3 The Paradox of Proof
	4 A Language Development Model
	5 The Pre-modern
	6 The Modern
		6.1 Textual Representation and the Subject-Object Dyad
		6.2 The Manifestation of Paradox in the Modern: The Law-Fact Dyad and the Conventional Theory of Juridical Proof
		6.3 The Growth in Textual Literacy and the Rise of the Expert
		6.4 The Impact of Documentary Evidence on Transaction Planning
		6.5 Credit Bureaus as a Foreshadowing of the Future
	7 The Post-modern
		7.1 Digital Language, Triadic Thinking, and Computer Embodiment: Meta-Communication, Simulation, and the Semiotic Cycle
		7.2 Disruptive Change in the Identity, Institutions, and Legitimation of Proof
		7.3 Dynamic Transaction Planning and Re-conceptualizing the Boundaries of Proof
		7.4 Testing the Limits of Evidence
	8 Conclusion
	References
Facts, Evidence and Proof: The Core Concepts of Law and History
	1 Introduction: Analogy Between Law and History
	2 The Concept of “Fact” in Law and History
		2.1 Similarity Between Legal Facts and Historical Facts
		2.2 The Difference Between Legal Facts and Historical Facts
		2.3 Facts and Stories: What Can Law Learn from History?
	3 The Concept of “Evidence” in Law and History
		3.1 Similarity Between Judicial Evidence and Historical Evidence
		3.2 The Difference Between Judicial Evidence and Historical Evidence
		3.3 On Evidence: What Can Law Learn from History?
	4 The Concept of “Proof” in Law and History
		4.1 Similarity Between Judicial Proof and Historical Proof
		4.2 The Difference Between Judicial Proof and Historical Proof
		4.3 Proof: What Can Law Learn from History?
	5 Conclusion
	References
The Generation of Probable Facts from Testimonies in Jurisprudence and Historiography
	1 Introduction
	2 Generation of Knowledge from Testimonies Versus Its Transmission
	3 Conceptualizing the Bayesian Model
	4 Coherence of What?
	5 Testimonial Independence
	6 Reliability
	7 Modular Generation of Knowledge from Multiple Testimonies
		7.1 Stage I
		7.2 Stage II: Alternative Information Flow Nets
		7.3 Stage III-Knowledge from Multiple Testimonies
	8 Historical and Legal Institutions and the Epistemology of Testimony
	References
Evidence and Facts: Perspectives from History
Why Can’t Oral Testimonies be Historical Facts? The Study of “Comfort Women” and Its Challenge to Modern Historiography
	1 Where Is the Written Evidence?
	2 Rhetoric, Relics and Archives—“Facts” in Modern Historiography
	3 The Primacy of Written Records in Japanese Historiography
	4 Ueno Chizuko’s Critical Challenge and Its Implications
	References
Interrogating Qi Shan Again: History, Law and Evidence Science
	1 Subjectivity of Evidence (Historical Materials)
	2 Subjectivity of the Process of Analysis and Proof
	3 The Subjectivity of the Theory of History
	4 Law Is not an Absolute Science of Evidence
	References
Judging the Past, Blaming the Past, Hailing the Past
	1 Ethical Relations to the Past (In Historical Culture)
	2 Seeking Social Justice
	3 Judging the Past and Blaming the Past
	4 Responsibilities
		4.1 Past Wrongdoings, Present Responsibility
		4.2 Responsibility for Bringing About the Present Condition, Responsibility for the Future
		4.3 Responsibility of the Few, Responsibility of All
	5 Blaming the Past, Hailing the Past, and the Rise of Moralizing
	References
Evidence and Facts: Perspectives from Law
Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases
	1 Introduction
	2 A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts
		2.1 The Need for an Empirically Sophisticated Judiciary
		2.2 A Proceduralist’s Guide to Constitutional Fact-Finding
		2.3 Judicial Review of Constitutional Fact-Finding
	3 Conclusion
	References
The Elaine Massacre: A Case Study in the Dialogue Between Law and History
	1 The Background
	2 The Lawyers’ Case: The White Narrative
	3 The Historians’ Case: The Black Narrative
	4 Conclusion
	References
How to Determine the Facts of a Criminal Case
	1 Introduction
	2 Reflection on the Objectification of the Standard of Proof
		2.1 The Concretizing of the Objective Standard of Proof
		2.2 Evaluation of the Objective Standard of Proof
	3 The Introduction of Subjective Elements
		3.1 The Introduction of “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”
		3.2 “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” in Its Original Sense
		3.3 The Intention to Introduce Subjective Elements
	4 The Relation Between the Objective Elements and Subjective Elements
		4.1 The Subjective Standard is Equal to the Objective Standard
		4.2 The Subjective Standard is Lower Than the Objective Standard
		4.3 The Integration of the Subjective and Objective Standards
		4.4 External Constraints upon the Subjective Standard: The Independence and Legitimacy of Judicial Adjudication
	5 Conclusion
	References
Facts and Evidence: A Case Study of Developments in England’s Old Bailey Criminal Court During the Eighteenth Century
	1 Introduction
	2 English Criminal Trials Around 1700
	3 English Criminal Trials 1770–1815
		3.1 Case Studies
		3.2 The Role of Counsel
		3.3 Cross-Examination
		3.4 Rules of Evidence
		3.5 The Judge’s Role
		3.6 The Establishment of an Adversarial Process
		3.7 Why the Change Took Place
		3.8 Risks Posed by the New Approach to Trials
		3.9 Reflections on This Case Study
	References
Case Studies in History and Law
Cleaning Up the Mess of Empire? Evidence, Time and Memory in ‘Historic Justice’ Cases Concerning the Former British Empire (2000–Present)
	1 Introduction
	2 Historic Justice in the UK: A Brief Background Sketch
	3 The Many Faces of Evidence in Historic Justice Cases
		3.1 Oral Testimony Versus Documentary Evidence
		3.2 Memory as Evidence
		3.3 Historical Context as (Corroborative) Evidence
		3.4 Historians as Expert Witnesses
		3.5 Evidence and the ‘Passage of Time’
		3.6 What Constitutes New and ‘Weighty or Compelling’ Evidence?
	4 Conclusion
	References
On Fact Cognition and Legal Reasoning in Song Dynasty Justice from the Perspective of Intellectual Rationality
	1 The Shift of Paradigm of Researching Justice in the Song Dynasty: From Whether the Judgement Was Conducted in Accordance with the Law to Whether Intellectual Rationality Was Followed
	2 “Distinguishing Shi from Fei”: Pursuit of Truth and Goodness in Judicial Verdicts in the Song Dynasty
	3 The Connection Between Fact and Law: Internal and External Justification Applied by Famous Judicial Officials in the Song Dynasty
	4 Law and Li: The Response of Famous Judicial Officials in the Song Dynasty to Difficulties in Finding and Justifying the Norms for Decision
	5 Conclusion: Legal Methods and Intellectual Rationality in the Justice of the Song Dynasty
	References
Can Truth Be Negotiated? Rethinking Plea Bargaining at the ICTY
	1 Introduction
	2 An Overview of Plea Bargaining at the ICTY
		2.1 The Acceptance of Plea Bargaining
		2.2 Rules of Plea Bargaining
		2.3 Reasons to Adopt Plea Bargaining
	3 The Conflict Between Plea Bargaining and Establishing the Truth
		3.1 Negotiable Charges
		3.2 Unexamined Accuracy of Self-Admission
		3.3 Omission of Trials
		3.4 Analysis from the Microscopic Perspective
	4 The Counterbalancing Mechanism Between Plea Bargaining and Establishing Truth
		4.1 Reliable Factual Basis
		4.2 Indispensable Value of Acknowledgement by the Defendants
		4.3 Improvements in the Total Quality of the Truth
		4.4 Analysis from the Macroscopic Perspective
	5 The Influence of Plea Bargaining on the Acceptance of the Truth
		5.1 Missing Details Are Inevitable
		5.2 Negative Effects of the Misinterpretation of Sentence Deduction
		5.3 The Potential Benefit is Undermined by Limited Participants in the Negotiation
	6 Conclusion
	References
A Historical Retrial of the Socrates Trial: Who Was the Victim of Guilt Presumption?
	1 Discrimination Between Fact-Findings of History and Law
	2 Particularities of Socrates’ Presumption of Guilt
	3 Possibilities of Socrates Being Acquitted
	4 Two Explanations of Socrates’ Desire for Death
	References
Seeking Truth in Law and History
How We Get to Know What Aaron Burr Did? Ascertaining Past Facts in History and in Law
	1 Shades of Truth About Aaron Burr in Two Events
		1.1 The Burr-Hamilton Duel
		1.2 The Burr Treason Trial
	2 Fact-Finding in the Court of History and of Law
		2.1 Reckoning with Past “Facts”
		2.2 Shared Needs and Tools of Inquiry
		2.3 Contextual Constraints on Selecting Evidence and Making Rational Inferences
	3 Judicial “Truth” of Burr in Two Events
		3.1 Two Events, Different Judicial Fates
		3.2 Drama Played—The Treason Trial of Burr
	4 Drama Never Played—The “Trial” of Burr for “Murdering” Hamilton
	5 Historical “Truth” of Burr in Two Events
		5.1 Two Events, Same Disagreements
		5.2 Burr: “Murderer” in History?
		5.3 Burr: “Traitor” in History?
	6 Proving Facts by Evidence-Inference Reasoning
		6.1 What “Fact” to Prove?
		6.2 A Modified Analytical “Evidence-Inference Reasoning” Model
	7 Comparative Advantages
	References
Chasing Truth from the Perspective of History
	1 An Overview of Cui Yingjie Case
		1.1 Multiple Versions About the Case Facts
		1.2 Which Version Tells the Fact?
	2 Why Evidence Does not Equal to Fact?
		2.1 The Manifestation Mode of Case Facts and Historical Facts
		2.2 Failed or Incomplete Formation of Fact
		2.3 The Crux of Failed Texts
	3 The Trial Requires What Type of Text?
		3.1 Fragmented Case Information
		3.2 From Chronicle to Narrative History
		3.3 Completed Case Facts: How Do Different Versions Remedy Fractures in Information
Charlemagne’s Imperial Title: From the Perspective of Evidence Science
	1 Imperial Coronation
	2 From ‘Rex Romanorum’ to ‘Imperator Romanum Gubernans Imperium’
	3 Roman Empire as a Geographical State
	4 From ‘Imperator Romanum Gubernans Imperium’ to ‘Imperator’
	5 Conclusions
	Appendix
	References