A Critical Assessment of Contemporary Cosmological Arguments: Towards a Renewed Case for Theism

Towards a Renewed Case for Theism
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
	A resurgence of metaphysics
	Structure of this thesis
	Ontological framework
	Methodology
	An initial objection
Traditional cosmological arguments: two paradigmatic forms
	Introduction
	The first paradigmatic form
		Premise (1)
		Premise (2)
		Premise (3)
		Premise (7)
		Premise (9)
		Evaluation
	The second paradigmatic form
		Premise (1*)
		Premise (3)
		Premise (4)
		Premise (7)
		Premise (9)
		Evaluation
	Closing remarks
The cosmological argument of Koons
	Introduction
	Background
	The argument
	Objections
		Objections discussed and criticized by Koons
			The classical Humean, Kantian and Russellian objections
			The objections from quantum mechanics and libertarian freedom
			The objections from infinite regress
			The objection that, typically, effects have contingent causes
			The multi-verse objection
			The objection that asks where the cause of the cosmos came from
		A new objection: the cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingents is not a first cause
	Closing remarks
The cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss
	Introduction
	Background
	The argument
	Objections
		Objections discussed and rebutted by Gale and Pruss (1999)
			The classical Humean objection
			The objection that q is not self-explaining
			The objection that the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact is unexplainable
			The objection that an essentially free and necessarily existing being is impossible
			The objection that the cosmos is caused by blind indeterministic mechanical causation
			The objection that the weak version of the principle of sufficient reason begs the question
			Summary
		Objections raised by Graham Oppy
			The objection that Leibniz’s weak version is no advance since it implies the strong one
			The objection that the new argument fails since Leibniz’s strong principle does not hold
			The objection that we are justified only to say that Leibniz’s weak principle is nearly true
			The objection that the abstract propositions employed beg the question or are unclear
			Summary
		Objections raised by Davey and Clifton
			The objection that, necessarily, the conjunction of all contingent truths is unexplainable
			The objection that we have no authority to infer that, possibly, the BCCF is explainable
			The objection that the weak version of Leibniz’s principle violates our modal intuitions
			Summary
		Objections raised by Almeida and Judisch
			Summary
		Further objections
			The possibility of an infinite downward regress within the proposition q is not excluded
			A being that brings all contingent things into existence itself violates libertarian theory
	Closing remarks
Cosmological arguments of Rasmussen
	Introduction
	The argument from a maximal contingent state of existence
		Background framework
		The argument
		An assessment
			An assessment of Rasmussen’s case for accepting the first premise
			An assessment of Rasmussen’s case for accepting the second premise
			An assessment of Rasmussen’s case for accepting the third premise
			Assessing objections to the new cosmological argument discussed by Rasmussen himself
			Does Rasmussen’s new cosmological argument qualify as an adequate first cause argument?
	Three additional alternative paths to the existence of a concrete necessary being
		The path from it being possible to explain why there is at least one concrete contingent object
		The path from it being possible to explain why there are exactly n concrete contingent objects
		The path from it being possible that there is a first caused contingent concrete particular
	Closing remarks
Atomism, causalism and the existence of a first cause
	Introduction
	Stage setting
	Parthood and composition
		Supplementation
		Composition-as-Identity
	The argument
		First step: every caused composite contains a caused simple
		Second step: the sum of all caused simples (called M) is an object
		Third step: M is not a cause
		Fourth step: the cause of M (called A) is uncaused
		Fifth step: A is a first cause
	In defense of the premises
		Premise (1): there are objects
		Premise (2): every composite object is ultimately composed of simple objects
		Premise (3): every object is caused or is the cause of one or more other objects
		Premise (4): the sum of all caused simple objects, if not empty, is an object
		Premise (5): the cause of an object is disjoint with that object
		Premise (6): every caused composite object contains a caused proper part
	Closing remarks
A critical assessment of the argument from causalism and atomism
	Introduction
	Objections discussed as part of the traditional Thomistic and Leibnizian arguments
	Objections discussed as part of the arguments of Koons, Gale & Pruss, and Rasmussen
		Objections from Hume, Kant and Russell
		Objections related to Koons’ argument
		Objections related to Gale and Pruss’s argument
		Objections related to Rasmussen’s arguments
	Objections specifically addressing the new argument’s framework or premises
		The objection that the underlying framework of the new argument is too restrictive
		The objection that the 2nd premise is insufficient to complete the new argument’s first step
		The objection that the sum of all caused simples is not prior to every caused object
		The objection that the new argument’s entailed first cause does not have to be a ‘unity’
		Objections addressing the new argument’s notion of causation or its causal principles
Conclusions and further work
	Introduction
	An inherent limitation of cosmological arguments
	Two further, more fundamental, problems
		Is the new argument incompatible with theism?
		Is there a tension between the framework’s generic nature and its specific defense?
	The case for theism
		Implications of the new cosmological argument
		Arguments for a personal first cause
			A deep linkage between the nature of cognition and the nature of reality
			An order of value of types of existents within which everything that exists participates
			The implications of the idea that reality is ultimately metaphysically intelligible
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Samenvatting
References
Curriculum Vitæ