A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution

Front Cover
......Page 1
Title Page
......Page 4
Copyright
......Page 5
Dedication
......Page 6
Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 12
1. A Cooperative Species......Page 14
2. The Evolution of Altruism in Humans......Page 21
2.1 Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints......Page 22
2.2 Social Preferences and Social Dilemmas......Page 23
2.3 Genes, Culture, Groups, and Institutions......Page 26
2.4 Preview......Page 31
3. Social Preferences......Page 32
3.1 Strong Reciprocity Is Common......Page 33
3.2 Free-Riders Undermine Cooperation......Page 35
3.3 Altruistic Punishment Sustains Cooperation......Page 37
3.4 Effective Punishment Depends on Legitimacy......Page 39
3.5 Purely Symbolic Punishment Is Effective......Page 42
3.6 People Punish Those Who Hurt Others......Page 44
3.7 Social Preferences Are Not Irrational......Page 45
3.8 Culture and Institutions Matter......Page 46
3.9 Behavior Is Conditioned on Group Membership......Page 48
3.10 People Enjoy Cooperating and Punishing Free-Riders......Page 51
3.11 Social Preferences in Laboratory and Natural Settings......Page 52
3.12 Competing Explanations......Page 55
4. The Sociobiology of Human Cooperation......Page 59
4.1 Inclusive Fitness and Human Cooperation......Page 61
4.2 Modeling Multi-level Selection......Page 65
4.3 Equilibrium Selection......Page 70
4.4 Reciprocal Altruism......Page 72
4.5 Reciprocal Altruism in Large Groups......Page 76
4.6 Reputation: Indirect Reciprocity......Page 81
4.7 Altruism as a Signal of Quality......Page 84
4.8 Positive Assortment......Page 85
4.9 Mechanisms and Motives......Page 88
5. Cooperative Homo economicus......Page 92
5.1 Folk Theorems and Evolutionary Dynamics......Page 93
5.2 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information......Page 96
5.3 The Folk Theorem with Private Information......Page 99
5.4 Evolutionarily Irrelevant Equilibria......Page 100
5.5 Social Norms and Correlated Equilibria......Page 102
5.6 The Missing Choreographer......Page 103
6. Ancestral Human Society......Page 106
6.1 Cosmopolitan Ancestors......Page 108
6.2 Genetic Evidence......Page 112
6.3 Prehistoric Warfare......Page 115
6.4 The Foundations of Social Order......Page 119
6.5 The Crucible of Cooperation......Page 123
7. The Coevolution of Institutions and Behaviors......Page 124
7.1 Selective Extinction......Page 128
7.2 Reproductive Leveling......Page 130
7.3 Genetic Differentiation between Groups......Page 133
7.4 Deme Extinction and the Evolution of Altruism......Page 134
7.5 The Australian Laboratory......Page 136
7.6 The Coevolution of Institutions and Altruism......Page 137
7.7 Simulating Gene-Culture Coevolution......Page 139
7.8 Levelers and Warriors......Page 143
8. Parochialism, Altruism, and War......Page 146
8.1 Parochial Altruism and War......Page 148
8.2 The Emergence of Parochial Altruism and War......Page 151
8.3 Simulated and Experimental Parochial Altruism......Page 155
8.4 The Legacy of a Past "Red in Tooth and Claw"......Page 159
9. The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity......Page 161
9.1 Coordinated Punishment......Page 163
9.2 Altruistic Punishment in a Realistic Demography......Page 169
9.3 The Emergence of Strong Reciprocity......Page 172
9.4 Why Coordinated Punishment Succeeds......Page 176
9.5 A Decentralized Social Order......Page 177
10. Socialization......Page 180
10.1 Cultural Transmission......Page 181
10.2 Socialization and the Survival of Fitness-Reducing Norms......Page 184
10.3 Genes, Culture, and the Internalization of Norms......Page 186
10.4 The Internalized Norm as Hitchhiker......Page 189
10.5 The Gene-Culture Coevolution of a Fitness-Reducing Norm......Page 192
10.6 How Can Internalized Norms Be Altruistic?......Page 193
10.7 The Programmable Brain......Page 196
11. Social Emotions......Page 199
11.1 Reciprocity, Shame, and Punishment......Page 201
11.2 The Evolution of Social Emotions......Page 204
11.3 The "Great Captains of Our Lives"......Page 205
12. Conclusion: Human Cooperation and Its Evolution......Page 208
12.1 The Origins of Human Cooperation......Page 209
12.2 The Future of Cooperation......Page 212
A1 Altruism Defined......Page 214
A2 Agent-Based Models......Page 215
A3 Game Theory......Page 220
A4 Dynamical Systems......Page 222
A5 The Replicator Dynamic......Page 225
A6 Continuation Probability and Time Discount Factor......Page 226
A7 Alternatives to the Standing Model......Page 227
A8 The Prisoner's Dilemma with Public and Private Signals......Page 228
A9 Student and Nonstudent Experimental Subjects......Page 230
A10 The Price Equation......Page 231
A11 Weak Multi-level Selection......Page 235
A12 Cooperation and Punishment with Quorum Sensing......Page 236
References
......Page 238
Subject Index......Page 264
Author Index......Page 268